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来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12863
DP12863 Understanding Informal Financing
Franklin Allen; Meijun Qian; Jing Xie
发表日期2018-04-11
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要This paper offers a framework to understand informal financing based on mechanisms to deal with asymmetric information and enforcement. We find that constructive informal financing such as trade credits and family borrowing that relies on information advantages or an altruistic relationship is associated with good firm performance. Underground financing such as money lenders who use violence for enforcement is not. Constructive informal financing is prevalent in regions where access to bank loans is extensive, while its role in supporting firm growth decreases with bank loan availability. International comparisons show that China is not an outlier but rather average in using informal financing.
主题Development Economics ; Financial Economics
关键词Informal financing Asymmetric information Social collateral Firm growth
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12863
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541673
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Franklin Allen,Meijun Qian,Jing Xie. DP12863 Understanding Informal Financing. 2018.
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