| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12866 |
| DP12866 Market Entry, Fighting Brands and Tacit Collusion: The Case of the French Mobile Telecommunications Market | |
| Marc Bourreau; Yutec Sun; Frank Verboven | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-04-13 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a major new entry in the French mobile telecommunications market, followed by the introduction of fighting brands by the three incumbent firms. Using an empirical oligopoly model with differentiated products, we show that the incumbents' launch of the fighting brands can be rationalized only as a breakdown of tacit collusion. In the absence of entry the incumbents successfully colluded on restricting their product variety to avoid cannibalization; the new entry of the low-end competition made such semi-collusion more difficult to sustain because of increased business stealing incentives. Consumers gained considerably from the added variety of the new entrant and the fighting brands, and to a lesser extent from the incumbents' price response to the entry. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Entry Fighting brand Semi-collusion Product variety Mobile telecommunications |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12866-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541677 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marc Bourreau,Yutec Sun,Frank Verboven. DP12866 Market Entry, Fighting Brands and Tacit Collusion: The Case of the French Mobile Telecommunications Market. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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