| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12872 |
| DP12872 Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules | |
| Marina Halac; Pierre Yared | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-04-16 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a simple delegation model to study rules based on instruments vs. targets. A principal faces a better informed but biased agent and relies on joint punishments as incentives. Instrument-based rules condition incentives on the agent's observable action; target-based rules condition incentives on outcomes that depend on the agent's action and private information. In each class, an optimal rule takes a threshold form and imposes the worst punishment upon violation. Target-based rules dominate instrument-based rules if and only if the agent's information is sufficiently precise. An optimal hybrid rule relaxes the instrument threshold whenever the target threshold is satisfied. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Policy rules Private information Delegation Mechanism design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12872 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541683 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marina Halac,Pierre Yared. DP12872 Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Marina Halac]的文章 |
| [Pierre Yared]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Marina Halac]的文章 |
| [Pierre Yared]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Marina Halac]的文章 |
| [Pierre Yared]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
