| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12892 |
| DP12892 Loyalty Shares with Tenure Voting - a Coasian bargain? Evidence from the Loi Florange Experiment | |
| Marco Becht | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-04-25 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | French listed companies can issue shares that confer two votes per share after a holding period of at least two years (loyalty shares with tenure voting rights). In 2014 the default rule changed from one-share-one-vote to loyalty shares. The Coase theorem predicts that ceteris paribus shareholders rewrite the corporate charter to preserve the pre-reform structure. The theorem also predicts that the proportion of loyalty shares in initial public offerings is unchanged. The paper shows that most one-share-one-vote companies reverted to the pre-reform contract. The exception were firms with a stake held by the French state. In initial public offerings, the new default rule had an impact; the proportion of loyalty share statutes increased from about forty to fifty percent after the passage of the law. Companies that kept the same statutes have a significantly higher market to book ratio than companies forced into a different regime. The evidence is broadly consistent with the predictions of the Coase theorem, but only in the absence of conflicted parties with veto power. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Loyalty shares Tenure voting Time-phased voting Dual-class shares Coase theorem One-share-one- vote |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12892 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541704 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Becht. DP12892 Loyalty Shares with Tenure Voting - a Coasian bargain? Evidence from the Loi Florange Experiment. 2018. |
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