| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP12896
|
| DP12896 Time vs. State in Insurance: Experimental Evidence from Contract Farming in Kenya |
| Lorenzo Casaburi
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-04-27
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The gains from insurance arise from the transfer of income across states. Yet, by requiring that the premium be paid upfront, standard insurance products also transfer income across time. We show that this intertemporal transfer can help explain low insurance demand, especially among the poor, and in a randomized control trial in Kenya we test a crop insurance product which removes it. The product is interlinked with a contract farming scheme: as with other inputs, the buyer of the crop offers the insurance and deducts the premium from farmer revenues at harvest time. The take-up rate for pay-at-harvest insurance is 72%, compared to 5% for the standard pay-upfront contract, and the difference is largest among poorer farmers. Additional experiments and outcomes provide evidence on the role of liquidity constraints, present bias, and counterparty risk, and find that enabling farmers to commit to pay the premium just one month later increases demand by 21 percentage points. |
| 主题 | Development Economics
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12896
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541708
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Lorenzo Casaburi. DP12896 Time vs. State in Insurance: Experimental Evidence from Contract Farming in Kenya. 2018.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
