| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12903 |
| DP12903 Fiscal and Monetary Regimes: A Strategic Approach | |
| Jean Barthélemy; Guillaume Plantin | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a full-fledged strategic analysis of Wallace’s “game of chicken”. A public sector facing legacy nominal liabilities is comprised of fiscal and monetary authorities that respectively set the primary surplus and the price level in a non-cooperative fashion. We find that the post 2008 feature of indefinitely postponed fiscal consolidation and rapid expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet is consistent with a strategic setting in which neither authority can commit to a policy beyond its current mandate, and the fiscal authority has more bargaining power than the monetary one at each date. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12903 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541714 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean Barthélemy,Guillaume Plantin. DP12903 Fiscal and Monetary Regimes: A Strategic Approach. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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