G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12913
DP12913 The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation
Rustom M Irani; Ralf R Meisenzahl; José-Luis Peydró
发表日期2018-05-04
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identication, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We nd that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce, and nonbanks step in. This reallocation has important spillovers: during the 2008 crisis, loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities are less likely to be rolled over and experience greater price volatility.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Shadow banks Risk-based capital regulation Basel iii Interactions between banks and nonbanks Trading by banks Distressed debt
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12913
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541724
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rustom M Irani,Ralf R Meisenzahl,José-Luis Peydró. DP12913 The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation. 2018.
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