| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12921 |
| DP12921 The Dynamics of Sovereign Debt Crises and Bailouts | |
| Harald Uhlig | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-07 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Motivated by the recent European debt crisis, this paper investigates the scope for a bailout guarantee in a sovereign debt crisis. Defaults may arise from negative income shocks, government impatience or a "sunspot"-coordinated buyers strike. We introduce a bailout agency, and characterize the strategy with the minimal actuarially fair intervention which guarantees the no-buyers-strike fundamental equilibrium, relying on the market for residual financing. The intervention makes it cheaper for governments to borrow, inducing them borrow more, leaving default probabilities possibly rather unchanged. The maximal backstop will be pulled precisely when fundamentals worsen. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| 关键词 | Default Bailouts Self-fulfilling crises Endogenous borrowing constraints Long-term debt Omt Eurozone debt crisis |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12921 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541732 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harald Uhlig. DP12921 The Dynamics of Sovereign Debt Crises and Bailouts. 2018. |
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