| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12927 |
| DP12927 Communication with Evidence in the Lab | |
| Jeanne Hagenbach; Eduardo Perez-Richet | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-11 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a class of sender-receiver disclosure games in the lab. Our experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure. We use local and global properties of the incentive graph to explain behavior and performance of players across different games. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose, while other types use vague messages. Receivers take the evidence disclosed by senders into account, and perform better in games with an acyclic graph. Senders perform better in games with a cyclic graph. The data is largely consistent with a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking based on the iterated elimination of obviously dominated strategies. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Sender-receiver game Hard evidence Information disclosure Masquerade relation Skepticism Obvious dominance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12927 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541739 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeanne Hagenbach,Eduardo Perez-Richet. DP12927 Communication with Evidence in the Lab. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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