| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12938 |
| DP12938 Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power: Theory and Experiments | |
| Salvatore Nunnari | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-17 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many domains, committees bargain over a sequence of policies and a policy remains in effect until a new agreement is reached. In this paper, I argue that, in order to assess the consequences of veto power, it is important to take into account this dynamic aspect. I analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game with an endogenous status quo policy. I show that, irrespective of legislators' patience and the initial division of resources, policy eventually gets arbitrarily close to full appropriation by the veto player; that increasing legislators' patience or decreasing the veto player's ability to set the agenda makes convergence to this outcome slower; and that the veto player supports reforms that decrease his allocation. These results stand in sharp contrast to the properties of models where committees bargain over a single policy. The main predictions of the theory find support in controlled laboratory experiments. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Dynamic legislative bargaining Endogenous status quo Veto power Markov perfect equilibrium Laboratory experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12938-2 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541749 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Salvatore Nunnari. DP12938 Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power: Theory and Experiments. 2018. |
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