| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12958 |
| DP12958 Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives | |
| Caterina Calsamiglia; maia guell | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-29 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using adminis- trative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by 1,020 euros, while a change to the top trading cycles mechanism would increase average welfare by 460 euros. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12958 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541767 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Caterina Calsamiglia,maia guell. DP12958 Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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