| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12964 |
| DP12964 Revenue Guarantee Equivalence | |
| Dirk Bergemann; Benjamin A Brooks; Stephen Morris | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including first-price, second-price, and English auctions. We rank auctions according to their revenue guarantees, i.e., the greatest lower bound of revenue across all informational environments, where we hold fixed the distribution of bidders' values. We conclude that if we restrict attention to the symmetric affiliated models of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and monotonic pure-strategy equilibria, first-price, second-price, and English auctions all have the same revenue guarantee, which is equal to that of the first-price auction as characterized by Bergemann, Brooks and Morris (2017). If we consider all equilibria or if we allow more general models of information, then first-price auctions have a greater revenue guarantee than all other auctions considered. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Revenue guarantee Common values Affiliated values Revenue equivalence Revenue ranking First-price auction Second-price auction English auction |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12964 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541772 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Bergemann,Benjamin A Brooks,Stephen Morris. DP12964 Revenue Guarantee Equivalence. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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