| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12976 |
| DP12976 Sovereign Default in a Monetary Union | |
| Federica Romei; Sergio de Ferra | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-05 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, sovereign default risk and the zero lower bound have limited the ability of policy-makers in the European monetary union to achieve their stabilization objective. This paper investigates the interaction between sovereign default risk and the conduct of monetary policy, when borrowers can act strategically and they share with their lenders a single currency in a monetary union. We address this question in an endogenous sovereign default model of heterogeneous countries in a monetary union, where the monetary authority may be constrained by the zero lower bound. We uncover three main results. First, in normal times, debtors have a stronger incentive to default to induce more expansionary monetary policy. Second, the zero lower bound, or constraints on monetary policy, may act as a disciplining device to enforce repayment of sovereign debt. Third, sovereign default risk induces countries with a preference for tight monetary policy to accept a laxer policy stance. These results help to shed light on the recent European experience of high default risk, expansionary monetary policyand low nominal interest rates. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Sovereign default Monetary union Zero lower bound Heterogeneous countries |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12976 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541784 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Federica Romei,Sergio de Ferra. DP12976 Sovereign Default in a Monetary Union. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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