| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12979 |
| DP12979 Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design | |
| Stefan Staubli | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-07 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Most countries reduce Disability Insurance (DI) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability—a notch— and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in Austria, we provide transparent and credible identification of the effect of financial incentives on DI beneficiaries’ earnings. Using rich administrative data, we document large and sharp bunching at the earnings threshold. However, the elasticity driving these responses is small. Our estimate suggests that relaxing the earnings threshold reduces fiscal cost only if program entry is very inelastic. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Disability insurance Labor supply Benefit notch Bunching |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12979 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541787 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stefan Staubli. DP12979 Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design. 2018. |
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