| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12984 |
| DP12984 Trust and Delegated Investing: A Money Doctors Experiment | |
| Martin Weber | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-11 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A recent theory by Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015) proposes that trust is an important component for delegated investing. This paper tests the theory in a laboratory experiment. Participants first play a trust game. Participants then act as investors who have to make two separate, delegated investment decisions. Using the amount returned in the trust game as measure of trustworthiness, we show that investors are willing to take substantially more risk when a money manager is more trustworthy, even if this manager charges higher costs. The willingness to take more risk and pay higher costs is increasing in the difference in trustworthiness of the two money managers. This finding is robust to different specifications of the difference in trustworthiness. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Trust Money doctor Investment decision Risk aversion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12984 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541792 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Weber. DP12984 Trust and Delegated Investing: A Money Doctors Experiment. 2018. |
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