| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12986 |
| DP12986 Optimal Dynamic Matching | |
| Mariagiovanna Baccara; SangMok Lee; Leeat Yariv | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-11 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeoff between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In discretionary settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium, but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify the welfare gain from centralization, which can be substantial, even for low waiting costs. We also evaluate welfare improvements generated by transfer schemes, and alternative priority protocols. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Dynamic matching Mechanism design Organ donation Market design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12986 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541794 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mariagiovanna Baccara,SangMok Lee,Leeat Yariv. DP12986 Optimal Dynamic Matching. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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