| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP13000
|
| DP13000 Oligopoly, Macroeconomic Performance, and Competition Policy |
| Jose Azar; Xavier Vives
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-19
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We develop a macroeconomic framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor. Each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities, which makes the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns to scale are non-increasing, then an increase in “effective” market concentration (which accounts for overlapping ownership) leads to declines in employment, real wages, and the labor share. Moreover, if the goal is to foster employment then (i) controlling common ownership and reducing concentration are complements and (ii) government jobs are a substitute for either policy. Yet when there are multiple sectors, due to an intersectoral pecuniary externality, an increase in common ownership can stimulate the economy when the elasticity of labor supply is high relative to the elasticity of substitution in product markets. We characterize for which ownership structures the monopolistically competitive limit or an oligopolistic one (where firms become small relative to the economy) are attained as the number of sectors in the economy increases. Finally, we provide a calibration to illustrate our results. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Industrial Organization
; Macroeconomics and Growth
|
| 关键词 | Ownership
Portfolio diversification
Labor share
market power
Oligopsony
Antitrust policy
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13000-0
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541807
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jose Azar,Xavier Vives. DP13000 Oligopoly, Macroeconomic Performance, and Competition Policy. 2018.
|
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