| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13004 |
| DP13004 Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination | |
| Alessandro Bonatti | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-19 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A long-lived consumer interacts with a sequence of firms in a stationary Gaussian setting. Each firm relies on the consumer's current score--an aggregate measure of past quantity signals discounted exponentially--to learn about her preferences and to set prices. In the unique stationary linear Markov equilibrium, the consumer reduces her demand to drive average prices below the no-information benchmark. The firms' learning is maximized by persistent scores, i.e., scores that overweigh past information relative to Bayes' rule when observing disaggregated data. Hidden scores--those only observed by firms--reduce demand sensitivity, increase expected prices, and reduce expected quantities. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Price discrimination Information design Consumer scores Signaling Ratchet effect Persistence transparency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13004 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541811 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Bonatti. DP13004 Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination. 2018. |
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