| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP13032
|
| DP13032 Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks |
| Patrick Bolton; Martin Oehmke
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-07-03
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution,
where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but may not be implementable.
First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators
fail to set up SPOE resolution ex ante. Second, when required ex-post transfers are too large, national
regulators ring-fence assets instead of cooperating in SPOE resolution. In this case, a multiple-point-of-
entry (MPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is pre-assigned, is more robust. Our analysis
highlights a fundamental link between efficient bank resolution and the operational structures and risks
of global banks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; International Macroeconomics and Finance
|
| 关键词 | Bank resolution
Single point of entry
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13032
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541839
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Patrick Bolton,Martin Oehmke. DP13032 Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks. 2018.
|
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