| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13051 |
| DP13051 Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? | |
| Ruben Enikolopov | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-07-15 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Abstract Traditionally, bureaucrats are viewed as a stereotypical example of employees with flat pay schedules and low-powered incentive schemes. This paper provides evidence that the wages of a particular group of senior bureaucrats – city managers in US cities – are tightly connected to city outcomes. City outcomes affect city managers' wages not only in the city in which they are currently employed, but also in the city in which they work afterwards. At the same time, the salaries of city managers do not react to observable exogenous shocks to city outcomes. These results suggest that the relationship between city outcomes and the wages of city managers reflects a reward for performance, rather than rent extraction, and that the power of these incentives is sufficiently strong. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | City managers Bureaucrats Pay for performance Incentives of politicians |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13051 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541857 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ruben Enikolopov. DP13051 Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?. 2018. |
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