Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP13053 |
DP13053 Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan | |
Ruben Enikolopov | |
发表日期 | 2018-07-16 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Using data from a field experiment across 500 villages in Afghanistan, we study how electoral accountability of local institutions affects the quality of governance. In villages with newly created elected councils, food aid distributed by local leaders is more likely to reach needy villagers. However, this effect is observed only if the council is mandated to be the entity responsible for managing the distribution. In the absence of such a mandate the presence of elected councils increases embezzlement without improving aid targeting. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, unclear and overlapping mandates may increase rent-seeking and worsen governance outcomes. |
主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
关键词 | Political institutions Field experiment Democratization Governance quality |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13053 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541859 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ruben Enikolopov. DP13053 Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan. 2018. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
个性服务 |
推荐该条目 |
保存到收藏夹 |
导出为Endnote文件 |
谷歌学术 |
谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
[Ruben Enikolopov]的文章 |
百度学术 |
百度学术中相似的文章 |
[Ruben Enikolopov]的文章 |
必应学术 |
必应学术中相似的文章 |
[Ruben Enikolopov]的文章 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。