| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13074 |
| DP13074 Costly Pretrial Agreements | |
| Leonardo Felli; Luca Anderlini; Giovanni Immordino | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-07-24 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex-ante, for the pretrial negotiation and possible agreement to become feasible. Even in a full information world, if the distribution of these costs is sufficiently mismatched with the distribution of the parties’ bargaining powers, a pretrial agreement may never be reached even though actual Court litigation is overall wasteful. Our results shed light on two key issues. First, a Plaintiff may initiate a law suit even though the parties fully anticipate that it will be settled out of Court. Second, the “likelihood” that a given law suit goes to trial is unaffected by how trial costs are distributed among the litigants. The choice of fee-shifting rule can only affect whether the Plaintiff files a law suit in the first place. It does not affect whether it is settled before trial or litigated in Court. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Pretrial agreements Costly negotiations Court litigation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13074 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541879 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leonardo Felli,Luca Anderlini,Giovanni Immordino. DP13074 Costly Pretrial Agreements. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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