| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13081 |
| DP13081 The Economic Effects of Electoral Rules: Evidence from Unemployment Benefits | |
| Vincenzo Galasso; Salvatore Nunnari | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-07-26 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides a novel test of the link from electoral rules to economic policies. We focus on unemployment benefits because their classification as a broad or targeted transfer may vary — over time and across countries — according to the geographical dispersion of unemployed citizens, the main beneficiaries of the program. A simple theoretical model delivers unambiguous predictions on the interaction between electoral institutions and the unemployment rate in contestable and safe districts: electoral incentives induce more generous unemployment benefits in majoritarian than in proportional systems if and only if the unemployment rate is higher in contestable than in safe districts. We test this prediction using a novel dataset with information on electoral competitiveness and unemployment rates at district level, and different measures of unemployment benefit generosity for 16 OECD countries between 1980 and 2011. The empirical analysis strongly supports the theoretical predictions. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Electoral rules Unemployment benefits Swing districts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13081-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541886 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vincenzo Galasso,Salvatore Nunnari. DP13081 The Economic Effects of Electoral Rules: Evidence from Unemployment Benefits. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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