| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13083 |
| DP13083 Upstream Bundling and Leverage of Market Power | |
| Alexandre de Cornière; Greg Taylor | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-07-27 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Motivated by the recent Google-Android antitrust case, we present a novel rationale for bundling by a multiproduct upstream firm. Consider a market where downstream firms procure components from upstream suppliers. U1 is the only supplier of component A, but faces competition for component B. Suppose that component A increases demand for the downstream product and that contractual frictions induce positive wholesale markups. By bundling A and B, U1 reduces its B-rivals’ willingness to offer slotting fees to the downstream firm, thereby allowing U1 to capture more of the industry profit. Bundling harms the downstream firm and the B rivals, and can be anticompetitive. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bundling Exclusion Vertical relations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13083 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541888 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexandre de Cornière,Greg Taylor. DP13083 Upstream Bundling and Leverage of Market Power. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
