| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13096 |
| DP13096 Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets | |
| Kate Ho; Robin Lee | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-07-31 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We evaluate the consequences of narrow hospital networks in commercial health care markets. We develop a bargaining solution, Nash-in-Nash with Threat of Replacement, that captures insurers' incentives to exclude, and combine it with California data and estimates from Ho and Lee (2017) to simulate equilibrium outcomes under social, consumer, and insurer-optimal networks. Private incentives to exclude generally exceed social incentives, as the insurer benefits from substantially lower negotiated hospital rates. Regulation prohibiting exclusion increases prices and premiums and lowers consumer welfare without significantly affecting social surplus. However, regulation may prevent harm to consumers living close to excluded hospitals. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13096 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541900 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kate Ho,Robin Lee. DP13096 Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets. 2018. |
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