| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13172 |
| DP13172 The I.O. of ethics and cheating when consumers do not have rational expectations | |
| John Thanassoulis | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-11 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I study the incentive of firms to be unethical in competitive markets, by conducting practices which illicitly harm stakeholders (consumers, workers, the environment) so as to raise profits. I offer a theoretical analysis which embeds consistent philosophical concerns (utilitarian, Kantian, and in some settings, Rawlsian) to evaluate the moral dilemma managers face of cheating stakeholders for profit in a model of competition with regulatory oversight. I characterise sufficiency conditions which apply broadly and which yield the result that more competition raises the equilibrium level of malpractice in Nash Equilibria of the competition game. If agents reason more deontologically, professing a duty-ethic, then oligopoly is linked to malpractice. I explore how firm level changes impact equilibrium malpractice drawing predictions for some aspects of FDI and for behavioural changes as firms approach the technological frontier. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Competition Malpractice Ethics Moral dilemma |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13172 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541976 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Thanassoulis. DP13172 The I.O. of ethics and cheating when consumers do not have rational expectations. 2018. |
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