| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13177 |
| DP13177 Economic Transition and the Rise of Alternative Institutions: Political Connections in Putin's Russia | |
| Konstantin Sonin; Natalia Lamberova | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-13 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The economic transition from socialism in Russia has not resulted in the emergence of impersonal, rule-based institutions. Instead, the natural demand for institutions that protect property rights has led to the emergence of alternative, inefficient institutions such as that of cronyism - the practice of appointing personal acquaintances of the political leader to key positions. A political leader not constrained by institutions appoints cronies, as competent subordinates are more prone to switching allegiance to a potential challenger. As competence makes a bigger difference in a rule-based environment, such a leader has no interest in any institutional development. In a simple empirical exercise, using a data set that covers the richest Russians, we find a positive and significant effect of direct connections to the personal circle of President Putin on the wealth of businessmen. The magnitude of the effect varies at different levels of rents available for redistribution and "network centrality of a businessman": it is higher during the years of high oil prices, but is attenuated by the prominence of the businessman in the network. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Alternative institutions Political connections Network analysis |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13177 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541981 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konstantin Sonin,Natalia Lamberova. DP13177 Economic Transition and the Rise of Alternative Institutions: Political Connections in Putin's Russia. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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