| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13189 |
| DP13189 Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup | |
| Konstantin Sonin | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-18 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Popular protests and palace coups are the two domestic threats to dictators. We show that free media, which informs citizens about their rulers, is a double-edged sword that alleviates one threat, but exacerbates the other. Informed citizens may protest against a ruler, but they may also protest to restore him after a palace coup. In choosing media freedom, the leader trades off these conflicting effects. We develop a model in which citizens engage in a regime change global game, and media freedom is a ruler's instrument for Bayesian persuasion, used to manage the competing risks of coups and protests. A coup switches the status quo from being in the ruler's favor to being against him. This introduces convexities in the ruler's Bayesian persuasion problem, causing him to benefit from an informed citizenry. Rulers tolerate freer press when citizens are pessimistic about them, or coups signal information about them to citizens. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Authoritarian politics Media freedom Protest Coup Global games Bayesian persuasion Signaling |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13189 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541992 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konstantin Sonin. DP13189 Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup. 2018. |
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