G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13189
DP13189 Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup
Konstantin Sonin
发表日期2018-09-18
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要Popular protests and palace coups are the two domestic threats to dictators. We show that free media, which informs citizens about their rulers, is a double-edged sword that alleviates one threat, but exacerbates the other. Informed citizens may protest against a ruler, but they may also protest to restore him after a palace coup. In choosing media freedom, the leader trades off these conflicting effects. We develop a model in which citizens engage in a regime change global game, and media freedom is a ruler's instrument for Bayesian persuasion, used to manage the competing risks of coups and protests. A coup switches the status quo from being in the ruler's favor to being against him. This introduces convexities in the ruler's Bayesian persuasion problem, causing him to benefit from an informed citizenry. Rulers tolerate freer press when citizens are pessimistic about them, or coups signal information about them to citizens.
主题Public Economics
关键词Authoritarian politics Media freedom Protest Coup Global games Bayesian persuasion Signaling
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13189
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541992
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Konstantin Sonin. DP13189 Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup. 2018.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Konstantin Sonin]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Konstantin Sonin]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Konstantin Sonin]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。