G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13190
DP13190 In-House and Arm's Length: Productivity Heterogeneity and Variation in Organizational Form.
Catherine Thomas; Stephen Lin; Arturs Kalnins
发表日期2018-09-19
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要This paper analyzes how firms are organized in the U.S. hotel management industry. For most hotel brands, properties with intermediate room occupancy rates are relatively more likely to be managed by company employees rather than by independent franchisees. Properties with the lowest and the highest occupancy rates tend to be managed by franchisees, at arm's length from the hotel chain. This variation in organizational form is consistent with a model in which the incentives embodied in management contracts vary with property-level productivity. We infer that most hotel chains franchise low productivity relationships to keep property-level fixed costs low and franchise the most productive relationships to create high powered incentives for franchisees. Franchisees of high-productivity properties work harder than the managers of both chain-managed properties and low-productivity franchises because the performance incentives in franchise contracts are proportional to hotel revenues and complement the incentives arising from having control over the property.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Firm heterogeneity Firm structure Incomplete contracts Outsourcing
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13190
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541993
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Catherine Thomas,Stephen Lin,Arturs Kalnins. DP13190 In-House and Arm's Length: Productivity Heterogeneity and Variation in Organizational Form.. 2018.
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