| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP13194
|
| DP13194 Shaming for Tax Enforcement: Evidence from a New Policy |
| Nadja Dwenger; Lukas Treber
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-20
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Many tax authorities make ample use of public shaming, mainly to enforce tax payments. However, our understanding of the policy is very limited. It is unclear whether public shaming affects corporations, which account for the bulk of unpaid taxes, and whether previously compliant taxpayers are adversely affected. This paper makes progress on these questions by exploiting comprehensive administrative tax data and the introduction of a novel naming-and-shaming policy in Slovenia in 2012 as a natural experiment. The policy affected both individuals and corporations. It was announced four months before its implementation, which allows us to separate responses to the threat of shaming from responses to actual shaming. We show that corporations reduce their tax debt by 8.5% in response to the threat of shaming, particularly in industries where reputational concerns are likely to be important. Individuals reduce their tax debt by 5%. The publication of the first naming-and-shaming list further reduces tax debt among shamed taxpayers. This effect, however, is marginal in terms of revenue and tapers off quickly. Previously compliant taxpayers remain compliant throughout. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Compliance
Tax debt
Shaming
Enforcement
Social image concerns
Penalty
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13194-1
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541997
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Nadja Dwenger,Lukas Treber. DP13194 Shaming for Tax Enforcement: Evidence from a New Policy. 2018.
|
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