| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13204 |
| DP13204 Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-26 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Who should own public projects? We report data from a laboratory experiment with 480 participants that was designed to test Besley and Ghatak's (2001) public-good version of the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights theory. Consider two parties, one of whom can invest in the provision of a public good. The parties value the public good differently. Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that more investments will be made if the high-valuation party is the owner, regardless of whether or not this party is the investor. While our experimental results provide support for the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory, they cast some doubts on the robustness of Besley and Ghatak's (2001) conclusion. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Property rights Public goods Incomplete contracts Investment incentives Laboratory experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13204 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542008 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP13204 Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence. 2018. |
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