| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13218 |
| DP13218 Corruption and Competition | |
| Franklin Allen; Jun Qian | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-05 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An interesting aspect of corruption is that its damaging effects on economic performance differ significantly across countries. In this paper, we show that if a central government col-lects sufficient taxes, it can curtail corruption by paying for performance of local govern-ment officials. An alternative way to reduce corruption is to introduce competition among local government officials. Difference in taxing ability and the magnitude of competition among government officials can help explain the heterogenous effects of corruption across countries. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Corruption Institutions Competition Taxes User fee |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13218 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542025 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Franklin Allen,Jun Qian. DP13218 Corruption and Competition. 2018. |
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