| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13226 |
| DP13226 The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment | |
| Florian Englmaier; Stefan Grimm; David Schindler; Simeon Schudy | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-08 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance threshold) they provide. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers' willingness to "explore" original solutions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Team work Bonus Incentives Loss Gain Non-routine Exploration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13226 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542035 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Florian Englmaier,Stefan Grimm,David Schindler,et al. DP13226 The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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