| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13227 |
| DP13227 Long-Term Employment Relations When Agents are Present Biased | |
| Florian Englmaier; Matthias Fahn | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-08 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze how agents' present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a "virtual" contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a "real" contract which they end up choosing. This virtual contract motivates the agent and allows the principal to keep the agent below his outside option. Moreover, under limited liability, implemented effort can be inefficiently high. With a finite time horizon, the degree of exploitation of agents decreases over the life-cycle. While the baseline model abstracts from moral hazard, we show that the result persists also when allowing for non-contractible effort. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Employment relations Dynamic contracting Present bias |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13227 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542036 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Florian Englmaier,Matthias Fahn. DP13227 Long-Term Employment Relations When Agents are Present Biased. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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