G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13227
DP13227 Long-Term Employment Relations When Agents are Present Biased
Florian Englmaier; Matthias Fahn
发表日期2018-10-08
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要We analyze how agents' present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a "virtual" contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a "real" contract which they end up choosing. This virtual contract motivates the agent and allows the principal to keep the agent below his outside option. Moreover, under limited liability, implemented effort can be inefficiently high. With a finite time horizon, the degree of exploitation of agents decreases over the life-cycle. While the baseline model abstracts from moral hazard, we show that the result persists also when allowing for non-contractible effort.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Employment relations Dynamic contracting Present bias
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13227
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542036
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Florian Englmaier,Matthias Fahn. DP13227 Long-Term Employment Relations When Agents are Present Biased. 2018.
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