| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13231 |
| DP13231 Looking into Crystal Balls: A Laboratory Experiment on Reputational Cheap Talk | |
| Debrah Meloso; Salvatore Nunnari; Marco Ottaviani | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-09 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We experimentally study cheap talk by reporters motivated by their reputation for being well informed. Evaluators assess reputation by cross checking the report with the realized state of the world. We manipulate the key drivers of misreporting incentives: the uncertainty about the state of the world and the beliefs of evaluators about the strategy of reporters. Consistent with theory, reporters are more likely to report truthfully when there is more uncertainty and when evaluators conjecture that reporters always report truthfully. However, the experiment highlights two phenomena not predicted by standard theory. First, a large fraction of reports is truthful, even when this is not a best response. Second, evaluators have diculty learning reporters' strategies and overreact to message accuracy. We show that a learning model where accuracy is erroneously taken to represent truthfulness ts well evaluators' behavior. This judgement bias reduces reporters' incentives to misreport and improves information transmission. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Forecasting Experts Reputation Cheap talk Laboratory experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13231-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542040 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Debrah Meloso,Salvatore Nunnari,Marco Ottaviani. DP13231 Looking into Crystal Balls: A Laboratory Experiment on Reputational Cheap Talk. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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