| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13244 |
| DP13244 Fake Persuasion | |
| Helios Herrera; Motty Perry | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-13 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a model of product reviews with honest and fake reviews to study the value of information provided on platforms like TripAdvisor, Yelp, etc. In every period, a review is posted which is either honest, namely reveals the reviewer's true experience with the product/service, or fake, namely entirely fabricated in order to manipulate the public's beliefs. We establish that the equilibrium is unique and derive robust and interesting results about these markets. While fake agents are able to affect the public's beliefs in their preferred direction, aggregation of information takes place as long as some of the reviews are honest. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Sender-receiver games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13244 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542052 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helios Herrera,Motty Perry. DP13244 Fake Persuasion. 2018. |
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