| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13248 |
| DP13248 Markets, Banks, and Shadow Banks | |
| David Martinez-Miera; Rafael Repullo | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-16 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the effect of bank capital requirements on the structure and risk of a financial system where markets, regulated banks, and shadow banks coexist. Banks face a moral hazard problem in screening entrepreneurs' projects, and they choose whether to be regulated or not. If regulated, a supervisor certifies their capital; if not, they have to rely on more expensive private certification. Under both risk-insensitive and risk-sensitive requirements, safer entrepreneurs borrow from the market and riskier entrepreneurs borrow from banks. But risk-insensitive (sensitive) requirements are especially costly for relatively safe (risky) entrepreneurs, which may shift from regulated to shadow banks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank regulation Bank supervision Capital requirements Credit screening Credit spreads Loan defaults Optimal regulation Market finance Shadow banks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13248 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542057 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Martinez-Miera,Rafael Repullo. DP13248 Markets, Banks, and Shadow Banks. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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