全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP13261 Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico’s Labor Courts

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP13261
	DP13261 Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico’s Labor Courts
	Christopher Woodruff; Joyce Sadka; Enrique Seira Bejarano
发表日期	2018-10-19
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use a field experiment with ongoing cases to analyze sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labor court. Providing the parties with personalized outcome predictions doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration, but only when the worker is present to receive the information. An intervention before plaintiffs contact a lawyer increases pre-suit settlement. The experiment illuminates agency issues among plaintiffs with private lawyers. For most workers, the treatment appears to improve welfare, as measured by discounted payouts and ability to pay bills.
主题	Development Economics
关键词	Labor courts Settlement Overconfidence Statistical information
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp13261-0
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542070
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Christopher Woodruff,Joyce Sadka,Enrique Seira Bejarano. DP13261 Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico’s Labor Courts. 2018.