| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13270 |
| DP13270 Incentives for Information Provision: Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Rental Market | |
| Natalia Fabra; Xueying Bian | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-20 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We build a search model with asymmetric information regarding houses´ energy efficiency. The objective is to shed light on the house owners` incentives to obtain and disclose energy certificates (ECs) in the rental market. Such incentives depend not only on the rent premium for more efficient houses - as has been widely documented - but also on the rent penalty for unlabeled houses. Interestingly, we show that such a penalty is higher the greater the disclosure rate of ECs. The theoretical predictions are empirically quantified in the context of the Spanish rental market. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Energy efficiency Adoption rate Rental market |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13270-1 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542079 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Natalia Fabra,Xueying Bian. DP13270 Incentives for Information Provision: Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Rental Market. 2018. |
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