| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13272 |
| DP13272 Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models | |
| Thijs van Rens; Christian Merkl | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-21 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in most labor market models all workers have the same probability of being hired. We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. We set up a model that is isomorphic to a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selective hiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but implications for welfare are different for two reasons. First, a hiring externality occurs with random but not with selective hiring. Second, the welfare costs of unemployment are much larger with selective hiring, because unemployment risk is distributed unequally across workers. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Labor market models Welfare Optimal unemployment insurance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13272 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542081 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thijs van Rens,Christian Merkl. DP13272 Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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