| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13280 |
| DP13280 Information Aggregation and Turnout in Proportional Representation: A Laboratory Experiment | |
| Helios Herrera; Aniol Llorente-Saguer | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-25 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyses voter participation in common interest proportional representation (PR) elections, comparing this with majority rule. Consistent with theoretical predictions, poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting, thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed. A dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under PR, so abstention is higher in PR in contrast with private interest environments, and welfare is lower. Deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), which allows for voter mistakes. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Turnout Information aggregation Proportional representation Majority rule Laboratory experiment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13280-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542090 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helios Herrera,Aniol Llorente-Saguer. DP13280 Information Aggregation and Turnout in Proportional Representation: A Laboratory Experiment. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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