G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13280
DP13280 Information Aggregation and Turnout in Proportional Representation: A Laboratory Experiment
Helios Herrera; Aniol Llorente-Saguer
发表日期2018-10-25
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要This paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyses voter participation in common interest proportional representation (PR) elections, comparing this with majority rule. Consistent with theoretical predictions, poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting, thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed. A dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under PR, so abstention is higher in PR in contrast with private interest environments, and welfare is lower. Deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), which allows for voter mistakes.
主题Public Economics
关键词Turnout Information aggregation Proportional representation Majority rule Laboratory experiment
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13280-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542090
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Helios Herrera,Aniol Llorente-Saguer. DP13280 Information Aggregation and Turnout in Proportional Representation: A Laboratory Experiment. 2018.
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