全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP13290 Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP13290
	DP13290 Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis
	Axel Dreher; Valentin Lang; B. Peter Rosendorff; James Raymond Vreeland
发表日期	2018-10-31
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are more skeptical of a target country, favors are granted via international organizations. We test this theory empirically by examining how the United States uses bilateral aid and IMF loans to buy other countries’ votes in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Introducing new data on voting behavior in the UNSC over the 1960-2015 period, our results show that states allied with the US receive more bilateral aid when voting in line with the United States in the UNSC, while concurring votes of states less allied with the US are rewarded with loans from the IMF. Temporary UNSC members that vote against the United States do not receive such perks.
主题	Development Economics ; Public Economics
关键词	United nations security council Voting Aid Imf World bank
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp13290
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542100
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Axel Dreher,Valentin Lang,B. Peter Rosendorff,et al. DP13290 Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis. 2018.