G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12398
DP12398 A Dynamic Theory of Secession
Joan Esteban; Sabine Flamand; Massimo Morelli; Dominic Rohner
发表日期2018-11-02
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要This paper builds a dynamic theory of secessions, conflictual or peaceful, analyzing the forward looking interaction between groups in a country. The proposed framework allows us to jointly address several key stylized facts on secession, and generates several novel predictions. We find that if a group out of power is small enough, then the group in power can always maintain peace with an acceptable offer of surplus sharing for every period, while when there is a mismatch between the relative size and the relative surplus contribution of the minority group, conflict followed by secession can occur. Accepted peaceful secession is predicted for large groups of similar prosperity, and higher patience is associated to a higher chance of secession. We formulate as a result a number of policy recommendations on various dimensions of federalism and other institutions.
主题Development Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Secessions Conflict Surplus sharing Mismatch
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12398-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542103
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Joan Esteban,Sabine Flamand,Massimo Morelli,et al. DP12398 A Dynamic Theory of Secession. 2018.
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