| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13297 |
| DP13297 The Political Economy of Multilateral Aid Funds | |
| Axel Dreher | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-11-03 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When allocating foreign aid, donor countries face a problem of incentivizing recipient countries to invest in state capacity. Here, we show that donors can incentivize recipient countries by committing to collective decision-making: If aid allocation decisions are made ex post via bargaining between donors, then the negotiated outcome will be skewed towards aggregate efficiency, which induces the recipients to compete over ex ante investments. Our model links the fund's composition of membership and its decision rules to participation, investment and allocation decisions. We also find that majority rule induces stronger competition between recipients, resulting in higher investments in state capacity. The qualitative predictions of our model are broadly consistent with empirical findings on multilateral aid. In particular, the model rationalizes our novel empirical finding that, relative to organizations that use a consensus rule, organizations that use majority are more responsive to changes in recipient-country quality. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Aid allocation Aid effectiveness International organizations Decision rules |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13297 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542108 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Axel Dreher. DP13297 The Political Economy of Multilateral Aid Funds. 2018. |
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