| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13316 |
| DP13316 Equitable Voting Rules | |
| Leeat Yariv | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-11-13 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A celebrated result in social choice is May's Theorem (May, 1952), providing the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a modification of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally, but have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population. We conclude that procedural fairness can coexist with the empowerment of a small minority of individuals. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from discrete mathematics and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Voting rules May's theorem Equity Social choice Finite groups |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13316 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542130 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leeat Yariv. DP13316 Equitable Voting Rules. 2018. |
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