G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13327
DP13327 Minority share acquisitions and collusion: evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs
Yossi Spiegel
发表日期2018-11-19
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要There is a growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may facilitate collusion. To examine this concern, we exploit the fact that leniency programs (LPs) are generally recognized as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements and study the effect that the introduction of an LP has on horizontal MS acquisitions. Using data from 63 countries over the period 1990-2013, we find a large increase in horizontal MS acquisitions in the year in which an LP is introduced, especially in large rivals. The effect is present however only in countries with an effective antitrust enforcement and low levels of corruption and only when the acquisitions involve stakes of 10% - 20%. These results suggest that MS acquisitions may stabilize collusive agreements that were destabilized by the introduction of the LP.
主题Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization
关键词Minority shareholdings Collusion Leniency programs Cartel stability
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13327
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542140
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Yossi Spiegel. DP13327 Minority share acquisitions and collusion: evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs. 2018.
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