| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13340 |
| DP13340 Collateral Booms and Information Depletion | |
| Alberto Martin; Vladimir Asriyan; Luc Laeven | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-11-29 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a new theory of information production during credit booms. In our model, entrepreneurs need credit to undertake investment projects, some of which enable them to divert resources towards private consumption. Lenders can protect themselves from such diversion in two ways: collateralization and costly screening, which generates durable information about projects. In equilibrium, the collateralization-screening mix depends on the value of aggregate collateral. High collateral values raise investment and economic activity, but they also raise collateralization at the expense of screening. This has important dynamic implications. During credit booms driven by high collateral values (e.g. real estate booms), the economy accumulates physical capital but depletes information about investment projects. As a result, collateral-driven booms end in deep crises and slow recoveries: when booms end, investment is constrained both by the lack of collateral and by the lack of information on existing investment projects, which takes time to rebuild. We provide new empirical evidence using US firm-level data in support of the model’s main mechanism. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Credit booms Collateral Information production Crises Missallocation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13340-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542152 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Martin,Vladimir Asriyan,Luc Laeven. DP13340 Collateral Booms and Information Depletion. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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