| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13343 |
| DP13343 Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement | |
| Estelle Cantillon | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-11-29 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A key policy argument in favor of emissions markets (relative to command-and-control types of regulation) is their ability to aggregate dispersed information and generate price signals to guide rms' trading and abatement decisions. We investigate this argument in a multi-period model where rms receive noisy private signals about their current period emissions and privately observe their previous period emissions before this information is made public to the rest of the market. Firms respond to information by trading and abating emissions. We show that there exists a rational expectations equilibrium that fully aggregates rms' private information, justifying the policy argument in favor of emissions markets, in the absence of other frictions. We also derive predictions about how prices should be reacting to new private or public information and show that the possibility of abatement dampens the impact of shocks on prices. Finally, we show that the information aggregation result breaks down if rms' abatement costs are also private information. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information aggregation Efficient market hypothesis Price formation Emissions trading |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13343 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542155 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Estelle Cantillon. DP13343 Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement. 2018. |
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