G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13343
DP13343 Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement
Estelle Cantillon
发表日期2018-11-29
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要A key policy argument in favor of emissions markets (relative to command-and-control types of regulation) is their ability to aggregate dispersed information and generate price signals to guide rms' trading and abatement decisions. We investigate this argument in a multi-period model where rms receive noisy private signals about their current period emissions and privately observe their previous period emissions before this information is made public to the rest of the market. Firms respond to information by trading and abating emissions. We show that there exists a rational expectations equilibrium that fully aggregates rms' private information, justifying the policy argument in favor of emissions markets, in the absence of other frictions. We also derive predictions about how prices should be reacting to new private or public information and show that the possibility of abatement dampens the impact of shocks on prices. Finally, we show that the information aggregation result breaks down if rms' abatement costs are also private information.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Information aggregation Efficient market hypothesis Price formation Emissions trading
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13343
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542155
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Estelle Cantillon. DP13343 Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement. 2018.
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