| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13357 |
| DP13357 Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Italy | |
| Gianni De Fraja; Stefano Verzillo | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-03 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we investigate the nature of the contracts between a large health-care purchaser and health service providers in a prospective payment system. We model theoretically the interaction between patients choice and cream-skimming by hospitals. We test the model using a very large and detailed administrative dataset for the largest region in Italy. In line with our theoretical results, we show that the state funded purchaser offers providers a system of incentives such that the most efficient providers both treat more patients and also treat more difficult patients, thus receiving a higher average payment per treatment. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Patients choice Cream skimming Optimal healthcare contracts Hospitals Lombardy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13357 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542168 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gianni De Fraja,Stefano Verzillo. DP13357 Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Italy. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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