| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13358 |
| DP13358 The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy | |
| Nickolay Gantchev; Mariassunta Giannetti | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-04 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that while low-cost shareholder activism via shareholder-sponsored proposals is occasionally value-enhancing, many proposals are submitted by the same few individual investors and other sponsors without organizational capabilities to analyze a large number of firms. These proposals if approved and subsequently implemented appear to destroy shareholder value. We show that firms whose shareholders are more likely to collect information before voting benefit from low-cost shareholder activism because these investors weed out low-quality proposals. We conclude that an informed shareholder base is crucial for firms to take advantage of low-cost shareholder activism. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Shareholder activism Shareholder proposals Shareholder voting Corporate governance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13358 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542169 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nickolay Gantchev,Mariassunta Giannetti. DP13358 The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
